The use of intuitions in philosophy is synonymous with the very method of philosophy. It is difficult to get away from talk or mention of 'intuition', 'intuitive' or 'intuitively'; they are signposts that reveal a philosopher's overtures to her reader, asking for the courtesy of seeing the self-evident, obvious and clear propositions in the same way that she herself sees them. They are often used with little reflection on what they actually are. Are they a kind of belief? Are they a sui generis cognitive state? Are they just guesses or hunches? Some take a stand on claiming such descriptions as defining intuitions, while others quietly let it slide while still employing intuitions on the side. Others may have an intuitive notion of what an intuition is, and though this may beg circularity it might be closer to the truth than saying something relatedly circular, say that one has a precept of what a precept is, or knowledge for what knowledge is. Having such an intuitive understanding of intuitions and their use is not to fault intuitions, relegating them to the bin of philosophical absurdities; having an understanding of what it is to find something intuitive, and to have the intuition of that something, is, in my humble eyes, as central an idea, and a problem, to philosophy as any other.