Before September 11, 2001, Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization. Considering Hezbollah's activities, ideology, organizational structure, and capabilities, the US Government considers Hezbollah a serious threat to national security. Given the organization's history and background, the question is not whether Hezbollah should be stopped; it is how? Studying Hezbollah not only illuminates the group's global reach characteristics and motivations, but also provides a useful case study for policy makers and strategists in formulating future long-term solutions and objectives in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In September 2001, the way the US Government viewed the threat of terrorism changed dramatically. Al Qaeda's attack on the United States raised global terrorism and terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction to the highest priority on President Bush's national security agenda.
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